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Defendant's
Burden to Reduce
Homocide to
Manslaughter
Violates the
Due Process
Clause
by Byron Warnken

On June 9, 1975, a unanimous Supreme Court held, in Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. - , 95 S.Ct. 1881 (1975),
that the law of the State of Maine, which
required a murder defendant to prove
by a fair preponderance of the evidence
that he acted in the heat of passion on
sudden provocation, in order to reduce
the homocide to manslaughter, violates
the requirements of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
At the 1966 trial of Stillman E. Wilbur,
Jr., the court, in its charge to the jury, instructed " ... that 'malice aforethought is
an essential and indispensable element
of the crime of murder, without which
the homocide would be manslaughter.
The jury was further instructed, however, that if the prosecution established
that the homocide was both intentional
and unlawful, malice aforethought was
to be conclusively implied unless the defendant proved by a fair preponderance
of the evidence that he acted in the heat
of passion on sudden provocation, ...
(and) by proving the latter the defendant
would negate the former and reduce the
homocide from murder to manslaughter." Id. at 1883-84. Upon conviction for
murder, Wilbur appealed to the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, contending
that he had been denied due process of
law as set forth inIn re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970), which required the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged. The Maine Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the
Winship requirement had been met, and
that the burden placed upon the defendant went only to the degree of the crime
and sentencing. "(I)n Maine murder and

manslaughter are not distinct crimes but
rather different degree of the single
generic offense of felonious homocide.
State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (1971)."
95 S.Ct. at 1884. The court also referenced over a century of using this presumption of implied malice aforethought
and the ensuing defendant's burden. In
addition, the court anticipated no retroactivity of Winship, a conclusion
which was later proven incorrect in Ivan
v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203
(1972).
Wilbur then petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court
for Maine. Wilbur v. Robbins, 349 F.
Supp. 149 (1972). The District Court
held that (1) murder and manslaughter
are distinct offenses under Maine statutes, (2) malice aforethought is the distinguishing element, and (3) In re Winship does not permit the prosecution to
rely upon a presumption of malice, but
requires the prosecution to prove malice
aforethough beyond a reasonable
doubt. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, although acknowledging that the
state court must interpret its own laws,
affirmed, Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d
943 (lstCir. 1973), stating that " ... a totally unsupportable construction which
leads to an invasion of constitutional due
process is a federal matter." Id. at 945.
When seven months later the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court reaffirmed its
view and criticized the First Circuit, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari
and remanded to the Court of Appeals,
414 U.S. 1139 (1974). The First Circuit
again relied on Winship, and the Supreme Court again granted certiorari, 419
U.S. 823 (1974), this time affirming.
After tracing the common law development, the court, through Mr. Justice Powell, noted that the presence or
absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation has been the single
most important factor in determining the
degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homocide and thqt the clear trend
indicates that a large majority of the
States now requires the prosecution to
bear the ultimate burden of proving the
fact beyond a reasonable doubt. 95 S.
Ct. at 1888.
Relying heavily upon Winship, the
court nullified Maine's argument that the

stigma of a felony has already attached
and the defendant's burden goes merely
to gradation:
The safeguards of due process are
not rendered unavailing simply because a determination may already
have been reached that would stigmatize the defendant and that might
lead to a significant impairment of
personal liberty. The fact remains
that the consequences resulting from
a verdict of murder, as compared
with a verdict of manslaughter, differ
significantly.
The result, in a case such as this one
where the defendant is required to
prov<~ the critical fact in dispute, is to
increase further the likelihood of an
erroneous murder conviction. Such a
result directly contravenes the principle (that) ... 'where one party has at
stake an interest of transcending
value - as a criminal defendant his
liberty - th(e) margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of
placing on the (prosecution) the burden ... of persuading the factfinder at
the conslusion of the trial...' (cites
omitted)
(T)his is the traditional burden which
our system of criminal justice deems
essential.
(W)e discern no unique hardship on
the prosecution that would justify requiring the defendant to carry the
burden of proving a fact so critical to
criminal culpability. Id. at 1889-91.
The Mullaney decision has direct and
immediate implications for Maryland,
which has preViously placed a burden
upon the defendant similar to that imposed by Maine. In Burko v. State, 19
Md. App. 645 (1974), cert. denied, 271
Md. 732 (1974), the appellant, convicted of second degree murder and
armed robbery, claimed a denial of due
process in an instruction that advised the
jury that in Maryland there exists a presumption that all homocides are committed with malice and constitute second
degree murder, thus placing a burden on
the defendant to establish by " ... a fair
preponderance of the evidence that the
killing happened under certain circumstances to redl'ce the homocide to
manslaughter." Id. at 659. In affirming
the conviction, the Court of Special Appeals noted the the appellant's reliance
upon Winship and the Mullaney decisions of the U.S. District Court and the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The opinCONTINUED ON PAGE 23

First, the client will benefit from a much
more personalized and human treatment of his problem and secondly, the
members of the profession of law will
have a much healthier attitude towards
dealing with their own lives.
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ion acknowledged that Winship has long
b~en the rule in Maryland, but nevertheless held that the " ... Maine statute ... is
dissimilar to the Maryland statutes concemed with the crime of murder." Id. at
660-61. The Supreme Court disagreed.
One week after Mullaney, the high court,
in Burko v. Maryland, ___ U.S.
-------,95 S. Ct. 2624 (1975), vacated
the judgement and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for further consideration in light of
Mullaney v. Wi/bur.

A unamimous Supreme Court has
told those states which have failed to join
the majority in eliminating the homocide
defendant's burden of redUCing the
crime to manslaughter that they have
been violating the constitutional rights of
due process of law guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. As for the possibility of retroactive application of Mullaney, when one considers the depandence of Mullaney on the Winship holding, itself retroactively applied, combined with the due process aspects, retroactively will almost certainly be an
issue litigated in the near future.
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Fortunately, we did not experience a
"blow".
The terrain is very barren. Seeing
moss, grass, or dwarf willow trees
(forty years' old, but one inch in
height) became a big thing with us.
But as desolate as the land is, it has a
stark beauty that you develop an appreciation of. In time I became very
territorial. One day I discovered an
area about ten miles from our
campsite that had been tested for oil
drilling. How disturbing itwas to me to
see the mark of man's corporate
exploitation in an environment previously unmarked by man. Coke and
whiskey bottles had made it to
Bathurst Island.
We also developed an appreciation
and respect for snimallife that is able
to survive in an environment with such
a limited food supply. The highlight of
our trip was discovering a herd of ten
musk oxen. I crawled to within sixtyfive yards of them and was able to take
some great pictures. The many skeletons of muskoxen that we found on the
tundra were proof of their constant
fight for survival. The arctic wolves
are their predators. The musk oxen
must stay strong and healthy because
the wolf flourishes on the weak.
We saw many ring seals; they are
very alert and always mindful of the
possible presence of a polar bear and
his clandestine technique of covering
his black nose with his white paw.
There were Peary caribou, a variety of
caribou quite small in stature. The
mating season brought an abundance
of birds including snow geese, snowy
owls, king eiders, ptarmigans, arctic
terns, knots, arctic loons, red
phalaropes, sanderlings, artic gulls,
and snow buntings. The arctic tern
lives at the South Pole and commutes
annually over twenty-two thousand
miles to the North Pole in order to
breed. The knowledge that no settlement has ever existed on Bathurst Is-

land must give the birds some incentive to breed there.
Personally, such an experience allowed me much time to think about
life and man's position on this earth
without man-imposed distractions or
limitations. It made me realize how
mundane my daily "problems" truly
are. StUdying law and seeing the many
conflicts man imposes upon himself
(either individually or collectively
through government), further reinforced within my own mind that man's
selfish desires create his own innerstruggle and emotional trauma. Our
society has so much materially, but
we have accomplished so little in developing man's inter-personal relationships and in developing a fine
sense of environmental appreciation.
Never before did I feel so peaceful in
mind and so close to nature.

When asked if I will go back to the
Arctic, my answer is, "Butof course."
My wife and I are already planning a
two week trip for next August to observe a large caribou migration and to
catch Arctic Char.

